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Annette Morris and Ken Oliphant 
VII. England and Wales 
Annette Morris and Ken Oliphant England and Wales 
 
A. Legislation 
 
There were no major legislative developments relating to tort law in England 
and Wales in 2014. 
 
 
B. Cases 
 
1. Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] United Kingdom Supreme 
Court (UKSC) 46, [2015] Law Reports, Appeal Cases (AC) 
106: Private Nuisance; Remedies1 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
In 2006, the claimants acquired a house in the vicinity of the defendant’s 
speedway racing stadium, which had been constructed following the grant of 
planning permission in 1975 and used for speedway racing and similar pursuits 
for most of the intervening period. The claimants alleged that the noise from the 
racing constituted an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
their land and was thus actionable in the tort of private nuisance. They issued 
proceedings in which they sought damages for the interference they had suf-
fered to date and an injunction to regulate the use of the stadium for speedway 
racing in the future. Following hearings in the High Court and Court of Appeal, 
the case was brought to the Supreme Court. 
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
Upholding the trial judge’s finding that there was an actionable private nui-
sance, the Supreme Court restored the injunction he had granted but observed 
 
_____ 
1 Noted by B Pontin, Private Nuisance in the Balance (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 119. 
1 
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that the defendant should be free to make an application for the injunction to be 
discharged and damages awarded instead. The Supreme Court emphasised that 
the award of damages in lieu of an injunction involves a classic exercise of dis-
cretion. Though Shelfer’s case2 suggested that such awards should be excep-
tional, no such restriction in fact exists. The guidelines formulated in Shelfer’s 
case and followed in many subsequent decisions should not act as a fetter  
on the court’s discretion. Though it would normally be right to refuse an injunc-
tion if the Shelfer criteria are satisfied, the fact that they are not all satisfied does 
not mean that an injunction should be granted. The public interest in the con-
tinuation of the defendant’s activity is a relevant factor in exercising the discre-
tion. 
The Supreme Court also gave guidance on a range of other issues relating to 
the tort of private nuisance, including the relevance of the locality in which the 
claimant’s land is located, the grant of planning permission to the defendant in 
respect of the activities in question and the priority in point of time of the de-
fendant’s use of his land relative to the claimant’s use of his (‘coming to the nui-
sance’); the defendant’s prior use of his land was also relevant to the defence of 
prescription, which the Supreme Court addressed as well. 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision heralds a change in the practice of the courts 
relating to the award of damages in lieu of an injunction. The power to make 
such awards dates back to the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’ 
Act) but is now to be found in sec 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The tradi-
tional view was that such awards should be regarded as exceptional because 
they amount to the forced transfer of the claimant’s property right to the de-
fendant at a price determined by the court (the damages being seen as the fee 
paid by the defendant to continue committing the nuisance). In the present 
case, the Supreme Court disputed this characterisation, Lord Sumption de-
scribing as ‘unduly moralistic’ the view that awarding damages in lieu of an 
injunction sanctions wrongdoing by allowing the defendant to pay for the right 
to go on doing it.3 
 
_____ 
2 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Law Reports, Chancery Division (Ch) 287. 
3 For academic argument, see M Wilde, Nuisance Law and Damages in Lieu of an Injunction: 
Challenging the Orthodoxy of the Shelfer Criteria, in: S Pitel et al (eds), Tort Law: Challenging 
Orthodoxy (2013). 
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Following this decision, it probably remains the law that the victim of a pri-
vate nuisance is prima facie entitled to an injunction,4 though Lord Sumption 
stated the contrary opinion: ‘There is much to be said for the view that damages 
are ordinarily an adequate remedy for nuisance and that an injunction should 
not usually be granted in a case where it is likely that conflicting interests are 
engaged other than the parties’ interests’.5 This proposition was specifically 
doubted by Lord Mance,6 however, and the question was expressly left open by 
the Supreme Court.7 
It may be noted that, in subsequent proceedings between the same parties,8 
the Supreme Court granted a suspension of the injunction against noise nui-
sance until the claimant’s house had been rebuilt following a fire. 
 
 
2. Hounga v Allen [2014] United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(UKSC) 47: Illegality Defence9 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
Miss Hounga, then aged 14, travelled from Nigeria to the UK to work as an au 
pair for Mrs Allen. Mrs Allen had arranged the trip though Miss Hounga was 
complicit in the arrangements in pretending to be Mrs Allen’s granddaughter in 
order to gain entry to the country. She was also aware that she had no right to 
work or remain in the UK. Miss Hounga was unpaid and physically abused by 
Mrs Allen who told her that she would be imprisoned if she left due to her illegal 
status. However, following an argument in 2008, Mrs Allen evicted Miss Hounga 
from the family home and so dismissed her from employment. Miss Hounga 
pursued claims for breach of contract and unfair dismissal, as well as a claim in 
the statutory tort of race discrimination under sec 4(2)(c) Race Relations Act 
1976 (now sec 39(2)(c) Equality Act 2010). Both the Employment Tribunal and 
Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the contract and unfair dismissal claims 
 
_____ 
4 [121] per Lord Neuberger. 
5 [161]. 
6 [168]. 
7 See also [127] per Lord Neuberger and [170] per Lord Clarke. 
8 Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd (No 2) [2014] UKSC 46, [2014] 3 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 555. 
9 Noted by R Epstein/N Squires (2014) 178 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 790 and M Zou/ 
J Goudkamp (2015) 29 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 56. 
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on the basis that they were tainted by illegality but allowed the statutory tort 
claim, awarding Miss Hounga £ 6,187 for injury to feelings. The Court of Appeal 
upheld Mrs Allen’s appeal on the ground that there was an inextricable link be-
tween Miss Hounga’s illegal act and her loss.10 Miss Hounga appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the defence of illegality should not 
apply. Lord Wilson (with whom Lady Hale and Lord Kerr agreed) grounded his 
judgment in public policy and found that the integrity of the legal system 
would not be compromised by allowing Miss Hounga’s claim.11 The damages 
awarded would not allow her to profit from her illegal conduct as they were to 
compensate her for the injury to her feelings. In addition, whilst allowing the 
claim was unlikely to encourage others in the position of Miss Hounga to enter 
into illegal employment contracts, applying the defence might well encourage 
those in the position of Mrs Allen to do so. Lord Wilson was also concerned 
that applying the defence in such a claim would ‘run strikingly counter to the 
prominent strain of public policy’ against human trafficking in the UK.12 As 
such, any aspects of public policy supporting the application of the defence 
should give way to aspects of public policy to which its application would be 
an affront.13 
Lord Hughes (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed) took a different approach. 
He found that Miss Hounga should succeed on the basis that there was an insuf-
ficiently close connection between her immigration offences and the statutory 
tort of discrimination.14 The immigration offences were merely the context in 
which the tort was committed.15 He was satisfied that allowing Miss Hounga to 
recover would not lead the court to condone behaviour it would otherwise con-
demn but disagreed with Lord Wilson’s reference to policy on human trafficking 
as a separate or additional reason for the decision.16  
 
_____ 
10 [2012] England & Wales Court of Appeal, Civil Division (EWCA Civ) 609. 
11 At [44]–[45]. 
12 At [52]. 
13 Ibid. 
14 At [59]. 
15 At [67]. 
16 Ibid. 
9 
10 
Brought to you by | University of Bristol
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/6/16 10:59 AM
England and Wales | 155 
 
c) Commentary 
 
Concerns surrounding the operation of the illegality defence in England and 
Wales are longstanding. The defence stems from Lord Mansfield’s dictum in 
Holman v Johnson that, as a matter of public policy, ‘no court will lend its aid to 
a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act’.17 The Law 
Commission of England and Wales considered the operation of the defence over 
many years.18 It identified six policy rationales underlying the defence, as fol-
lows: (1) furthering the purpose of the rule of law which the claimant’s illegal 
behaviour has infringed; (2) consistency; (3) the need to prevent the claimant 
from profiting from his own wrong; (4) deterrence; (5) maintaining the integrity 
of the legal system and (6) punishment.19  
The courts have sought to develop various legal tests to determine the nec-
essary relationship between the claimant’s illegality and the claim. The ‘reli-
ance’ test stemming from Tinsley v Milligan provides that the defence should 
apply where the claimant would have to rely on his illegal conduct in order to 
found the claim.20 The courts have also applied the defence where the claim is 
‘so closely connected or inextricably bound up’ with the claimant’s illegality 
that allowing the claim would appear to condone the conduct.21  
In 2009, the Law Commission urged the courts not to apply such rigid tests but 
to consider, in each case, whether the application of the defence could be justified 
in policy terms.22 Such transparency, it argued, would help the law develop in a 
way that was clearer, more certain and less arbitrary. This approach was taken in 
Gray where Lord Hoffmann stated that the defence is ‘not so much a principle as a 
policy… based [not] upon a single justification but on a group of reasons, which 
vary in different situations’.23 In Gray itself, Lord Hoffmann focused on the policy 
of consistency between criminal and civil law.24 He then considered whether there 
 
_____ 
17 (1775) 1 Cowper’s King’s Bench Reports (Cowp) 341 at 343. 
18 Law Commission: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts, Consultation Paper No 154 
(1999); The Illegality Defence in Tort, Consultation Paper No 160 (2001); The Illegality Defence: 
A Consultative Report, Consultation Paper No 189 (2009) and The Illegality Defence, Final 
Report No 320 (2010). 
19 Law Commission, 2009 (fn 18) paras 2.5–2.31. 
20 [1994] 1 AC 340. 
21 Cross v Kirkby [2000] EWCA Civ 426. 
22 Law Commission, 2009 (fn 18) para 7.67. 
23 Gray v Thames Trains [2009] UKHL 33 at [30]. Noted in A Morris/K Oliphant, England and 
Wales, European Tort Law (ETL) 2009 (2010) 134, no 21 ff. 
24 Ibid at [29]. 
11 
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was a sufficient causal connection between the illegality and the claimant’s loss. 
As the common law seemed to be moving in the right direction, the Law Commis-
sion did not recommend legislative reform in the context of tort.25 
The fact that Lord Wilson grounded his judgment in public policy would 
presumably be welcomed by the Law Commission. Nevertheless, the relation-
ship between policy and the defence remains unclear because, as outlined 
above, the Lords disagreed as to whether they should look to policy considera-
tions beyond those underpinning the illegality defence itself. In addition, Lord 
Wilson referred to legal tests previously developed by the courts in such a way 
as to leave their relevance and status unclear. He stated that the ‘reliance’ test 
had ‘maximum precedential authority’ but did not go on to apply it to the facts 
of Hounga.26 Instead, he recognised the criticism that the test can work arbitrar-
ily and approved its softening in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens27 by the 
need to consider underlying policy.28 He was critical of the causation approach 
advocated in Gray as he noted its potential for inconsistent application driven 
by subjective considerations.29 He also stated that if the ‘inextricable link’ test 
applied, such a link did not exist on the facts.30 However, he did not comment 
on whether such a test did in fact apply though he was critical of it. The general 
consensus is that the Supreme Court reached the right decision on the facts but 
that it has muddied the legal waters on the defence of illegality.31 
 
 
3. Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex [2014] UKSC 55: Illegality 
Defence32 
 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
 
Servier held a number of patents for a drug used to treat hypertension and car-
diac insufficiency. A UK patent protected a crystalline form of the drug whilst a 
 
_____ 
25 Law Commission, 2010 (fn 18) para 3.38. 
26 At [30]. 
27 [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] AC 1391. 
28 At [30]. 
29 At [37]. 
30 At [40]–[41]. 
31 See J Goudkamp/M Zou, The Defence of Illegality in Tort Law: Beyond Judicial Redemption? 
[2015] Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 13. 
32 Noted by J Harris (2014) 164 (7633) New Law Journal (NLJ) 10. 
14 
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Canadian patent protected the compound itself. Apotex manufactured the drugs 
in Canada and began to sell the drugs in the UK. Servier obtained an interim in-
junction against them but was required to give a cross-undertaking in damages. 
The UK patent was found to be invalid and so Apotex became entitled to damages 
on the basis that it would have sold over 3.6 million packs of the drugs in the UK 
had the injunction not been in place. However, the Canadian courts upheld the 
Canadian patent, which Apotex had infringed by manufacturing the drug in that 
jurisdiction. This led Servier to raise the defence of illegality in the context of the 
damages claim in the UK. It argued that it would be contrary to public policy for 
Apotex to recover damages because it would have to rely on its illegal behaviour 
under Canadian law to establish its loss. Servier was successful at first instance 
but the Court of Appeal reversed Arnold J’s decision and held that the defence of 
illegality should not apply.33 Servier appealed to the Supreme Court.  
 
 
b) Judgment of the Court 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The infringement of the 
Canadian patent did not constitute ‘turpitude’ for the purposes of the illegality 
defence. Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke and Lord 
Mance agreed) delivered the lead judgment. He stated that turpitude in this con-
text involves a breach of the public law of the state (or in some cases its public 
policy), which would include criminal and certain quasi-criminal acts such as: 
dishonesty or corruption; acts (such as prostitution) which are not criminal in 
themselves but which are contrary to public policy and which usually involve 
criminal liability on the part of others and breaches of statutory rules enacted to 
protect the public interest and attracting civil sanctions of a penal character.34 
The infringement of the patent did not constitute turpitude because it was neither 
a criminal nor quasi-criminal act and so did not engage the public interest.35 
 
 
c) Commentary 
 
Unlike Hounga v Allen, which considered the necessary relationship between 
the claimant’s illegality and the claim, this case considered which acts consti-
 
_____ 
33 [2012] EWCA Civ 593. 
34 At [25]. 
35 At [30]. 
16 
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tute turpitude for the purposes of the illegality defence. Whilst both the Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court agreed that the patent infringement was not turpi-
tude, their reasoning differed. 
The Court of Appeal did not consider that acts necessarily constituted turpi-
tude or not but noted that it depended on the precise circumstances of the 
case.36 The Court of Appeal was bound by the ‘reliance’ test laid down in Tinsley 
v Milligan.37 However, Etherton LJ noted that a wider view of the law was open to 
the court given Lord Hoffmann’s dicta in Gray v Thames Trains that the policy 
underlying the defence ‘is not based upon a single justification but on a group 
of reasons, which vary in different situations’.38 This led Etherton LJ (with whom 
Laws LJ and Kitchin LJ agreed) to state that in deciding whether the defence 
should apply, the court was entitled ‘to take into account a wide range of con-
siderations in order to ensure that the defence only applies where it is a just and 
proportionate response to the illegality involved in the light of the policy con-
siderations underlying it’.39 With this in mind, the court found that the in-
fringement of the patent did not constitute turpitude because: Apotex honestly 
and reasonably believed that the Canadian patent was invalid too; Servier had 
enjoyed a monopoly to which it was not entitled; the patent infringement 
stemming from the sale of the drugs in the UK was limited to Canada; the manu-
facture of the drugs in Canada did not breach an interim injunction as the Ca-
nadian court had refused to grant one and any issues of public policy stemming 
from Apotex’s actions could sufficiently be addressed through damages in the 
context of private law.40  
Lord Toulson stated that the Court of Appeal had acted correctly in taking 
public policy considerations into account as the defence is based on public pol-
icy, as had been recognised by the Supreme Court in Hounga.41 However, the 
majority in the Supreme Court did not agree that the issue should be determined 
by a subjective evaluation of the merits of the parties’ respective claims or by an 
assessment of how badly Apotex had behaved.42 Lord Sumption expressed his 
concern that this kind of discretionary approach could lead to inconsistency, as 
had happened in this case. The Court of Appeal and judge at first instance had 
 
_____ 
36 At [76] per Etherton LJ. 
37 See above no 12 (fn 20). 
38 At [73], citing Lord Hoffmann in Gray v Thames Trains (fn 23) at [30]. 
39 At [73]. 
40 At [80]–[83]. 
41 At [62]. 
42 At [21]. 
18 
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reached different decisions on the facts because they had attached different 
weight to the importance of complying with the Canadian patent and to Apo-
tex’s argument that it believed the Canadian patent to be invalid.43  
Lord Sumption stated that the defence of illegality is a rule of law based on 
public policy and not a mere discretionary power.44 In recognising that the pol-
icy reasons underlying the illegality defence could vary in different situations, 
Lord Hoffmann in Gray had not meant to encourage the courts to make ‘value 
judgments about the seriousness of the illegality and the impact on the parties 
of allowing the defence’.45 Instead, as courts commonly do, he had examined 
the policy rationale of a rule of law in order to discover what the rule was.46 In 
deciding which acts constitute turpitude, therefore, the court should focus on 
the character of the alleged illegal act itself rather than the wider circumstances. 
Taking this approach, he concluded that turpitude includes ‘acts which engage 
the interests of the state or, as we would put it today, the public interest… irre-
spective of the interests or the rights of the parties’.47 Whilst criminal and quasi-
criminal acts would engage the public interest, torts (other than those involving 
dishonesty), breaches of contract, statutory and other civil wrongs would not, 
as they essentially involve private rather than public interests.48 Whilst a patent 
is granted by the state, it does not follow that the public interest is engaged by 
its infringement.49 The interest affected is that of the patentee which can suffi-
ciently be protected through damages. 
The Supreme Court’s clarification of the acts that constitute turpitude is to 
be welcomed but in other respects the decision has muddied the waters further. 
Following the decision in Gray v Thames Trains, the Law Commission felt that 
the courts were moving in the right direction so that legislative reform was un-
necessary in the context of tort but it is now clear that the courts are interpreting 
Gray in different ways. Given the finding in relation to turpitude, the Court did 
not go on to consider the necessary relationship between the claimant’s illegal-
ity and the claim though much confusion remains. On the one hand, whilst not 
referring directly to the ‘reliance’ test from Tinsley v Milligan, Lord Sumption 
spoke favourably of the decision and was critical of the Law Commission’s 
 
_____ 
43 At [21]. 
44 At [13]. 
45 Ibid. 
46 At [19]. 
47 At [23]. 
48 At [28]. 
49 At [30]. 
20 
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analysis in this area. On the other hand, Lord Touslon noted it may be necessary 
for the court to ‘carry out a detailed re-analysis of Tinsely v Milligan’ given sub-
sequent authorities.50 For those who have extra-judicially called for the Law 
Commission to re-examine the law in this area, even that would not be enough.51 
Another area of debate is likely to stem from the required seriousness of the 
criminal or quasi-criminal act for the illegality defence to bite. Lord Sumption 
acknowledged that there would be exceptional cases where even a criminal or 
quasi-criminal act would not be sufficient to constitute turpitude for the pur-
poses of the illegality defence, such as strict liability criminal offences where 
the claimant was not privy to the facts making his act unlawful.52 In Joyce v 
O’Brien & Tradex, the Court of Appeal suggested that minor traffic offences 
should also be excluded.53  
 
 
4. Personal Injury 
 
a) Trends in Personal Injury Claims 
 
The number of claims remained relatively stable in 2013-2014 with approxi-
mately 1,016,801 claims, compared to 1,048,309 in 2012–2013.54 Road traffic ac-
cident (RTA) claims continued to dominate, comprising 76% of all claims. There 
was an increase in clinical negligence claims which rose from 16,006 in 2012–
2013 to 18,499 such claims. This continues the upward trend seen in recent 
years though such claims continue to constitute less than 2% of all personal 
injury claims.  
 
 
b) Parliamentary Activity 
 
The number of road traffic accidents has more than doubled since 2004 and this 
has been attributed to a significant increase in whiplash claims which now re-
 
_____ 
50 At [64]. 
51 See J Mance, Ex Turpi Causa – When Latin Avoids Liability (2014) 18 Edinburgh Law Review 
175 and J Sumption, Reflections of the Law of Illegality (2012) 20 Restitution Law Review 1. 
52 At [29]. 
53 [2013] EWCA Civ 546. 
54 These figures include all personal injury claims whether successful or unsuccessful, settled 
or tried and have been provided by the Compensation Recovery Unit. 
22 
23 
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portedly constitute around 70% of all RTA claims.55 Given the non-demonstrable 
nature of soft-tissue injuries, there are understandable concerns surrounding 
fraud and exaggeration. There are also concerns about the impact of such claims 
on the cost and availability of motor insurance.56 As outlined in European Tort 
Law 2013,57 the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) published its policy on tackling the per-
ceived problem with whiplash claims and in 2014 it began its programme of im-
plementation. In October, the Civil Procedure Rules were amended to fix the 
costs of obtaining medical reports in whiplash claims; prohibit the reporting ex-
pert from also treating the claimant and to allow defendants to submit their ver-
sion of events to the expert.58 The MoJ also consulted on reforms concerning the 
accreditation and commissioning of medical reports.59 From April 2015 onwards, 
medico-legal experts will need to be registered with an organisation named 
MedCo in order to provide initial medico-legal reports for RTA soft-tissue injury 
claims.60 The next phase of reforms will involve increased data sharing on claim-
ants’ patterns of behaviour. Representatives will be required to undertake a 
search on potential claimants’ recent claims history so that they can make an 
informed judgement on whether to proceed with the claim.  
During 2014, the Ministry of Justice also sponsored two bills affecting per-
sonal injury claims, which received Royal Assent in 2015. They stem from the 
Government’s concerns that the tort system has become too claimant-friendly 
and will be reported in more detail in European Tort Law 2015. Section 57 of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 provides that where a court finds that the 
claimant is entitled to damages, but on the balance of probabilities is satisfied 
that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest in relation to either the 
claim itself (the primary claim) or a related claim, it must dismiss the primary 
claim entirely unless it is satisfied that the claimant would suffer substantial 
 
_____ 
55 See further R Lewis/A Morris, Tort Law Culture: Image and Reality (2012) 3 Journal of Euro-
pean Tort Law (JETL) 162 and (2012) 39 Journal of Law & Society 562 and R Lewis, Compensation 
Culture Reviewed: Incentives to Claim and Damages Levels [2014] Journal of Personal Injury 
Law (JPIL) 209. 
56 House of Commons Transport Committee, The Cost of Motor Insurance, Fourth Report (HC 
591, 2011). 
57 See A Morris/K Oliphant, England and Wales, in: E Karner/BC Steininger (eds), ETL 2013 
(2014) 183, no 37. 
58 The Civil Procedure (Amendment No 6) Rules 2014. 
59 Ministry of Justice, Whiplash Reform Programme: Consultation on Independence in Medical 
Reporting and Expert Accreditation (2014). 
60 Ministry of Justice, Whiplash Reform Programme: Ministry of Justice Response to Consulta-
tion on Independence on Medical Reporting and Expert Accreditation (2014). 
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injustice as a result. The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 
provides that in deciding whether a defendant is in breach of duty, the court 
must consider whether the defendant: was acting for the benefit of society at the 
time of the alleged breach; had demonstrated a predominantly responsible ap-
proach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others; or was acting 
heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger. 
 
 
c) Legal Issues 
 
In 2014, the Court of Appeal dealt with two interesting cases on vicarious liabil-
ity. Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc concerned a claimant of Somali 
descent who visited a petrol station owned by the defendants.61 He went to the 
kiosk to ask a question but the employee responded in an abusive and racist 
manner and so he returned to his car. Despite remonstrations from his supervi-
sor, the employee followed the claimant and physically assaulted him in a ‘bru-
tal and unprovoked’ attack. The Court of Appeal found that the defendant was 
not vicariously liable for the employee’s assault as there was an insufficiently 
close connection between the wrongdoing and the employment. The fact that 
the claimant was assaulted on the defendant’s premises by an employee during 
working hours and that the employment provided the opportunity, setting, time 
and place for the tort to occur was not enough for a close connection to arise. 
Some other feature going beyond the interaction between the employee and the 
victim was required. It was noted that previous cases had examined the ques-
tion of close connection by reference to factors such as the granting of author-
ity, the furtherance of the employer’s aims, the inherence of friction or confron-
tation in the employment and the additional risk of the kind of wrong occurring. 
However, no such factors were present in this particular case.  
In the second case, Cox v Ministry of Justice, the Court of Appeal held that 
the relationship between the MoJ and a prisoner working in the prison kitchen 
was akin to employment so that vicarious liability could arise.62 The claimant, a 
catering manager at the prison, sustained a serious injury when a prisoner 
working in the kitchen negligently dropped a large sack of rice on her back as 
she was bending down. With reference to criteria laid down in Various Claim-
ants v Catholic Child Welfare Society & Others, the Court of Appeal stated that 
the MoJ was more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the 
 
_____ 
61 [2014] EWCA Civ 116. 
62 [2014] EWCA Civ 132. Noted by A Bell (2014) 2 Journal of Professional Negligence 107. 
26 
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prisoner and could be expected to have insured against the liability.63 The MoJ, 
in requiring the prisoner to work in the kitchen, had created the risk of the tort 
committed and the prisoner had been under the control of the MoJ. The work 
carried out was different from, for example, the rehabilitation of prisoners and 
was essential to the functioning of the prison and the use of prisoners relieved 
the MoJ from having to engage employees at market rates. As the MoJ took the 
benefit of this work, the Court of Appeal could see no reason for it not to take its 
burdens. Both Mohamud and Cox were appealed to the Supreme Court, the deci-
sions of which shall be reported in European Tort Law 2015.  
In Thompson v Renwick Group Plc, the Court of Appeal again considered 
whether a parent company owed a duty of care to an employee of one of its sub-
sidiaries.64 The claimant was employed by two companies between 1969 and 1978. 
Both companies exposed him to asbestos and both became subsidiaries of Ren-
wick Group plc through a series of acquisitions. In 1976, the defendant appointed 
a new director to the second company who was involved in health and safety mat-
ters. Unfortunately, the claimant later developed pleural thickening but by this 
time neither company was worth suing nor had liability insurance in place. In 
Chandler v Cape plc, the Court of Appeal had held that it was not necessary for a 
parent company to have absolute control of its subsidiary for a duty to arise but 
only ‘relevant control’ where: (1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are 
in a relevant respect the same; (2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior 
knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in a particular industry; 
(3) the subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as the parent company knew or ought 
to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the sub-
sidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the 
employees’ protection.65 However, in Thompson, the court clarified that these fac-
tors were descriptive rather than exhaustive and in any event did not find that the 
factors were satisfied on the facts of the case. A duty did not arise just because the 
parent company had appointed a director to the second company who had some 
health and safety responsibilities. In addition, it had not been shown that the 
claimant’s employers carried on the same business as the parent company or 
that the latter had any better knowledge or understanding of asbestos. The evi-
dence suggested that the parent company simply held shares in the companies 
and so it would not be fair, just or reasonable for a duty to be imposed. 
 
_____ 
63 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1. 
64 [2014] EWCA Civ 635. 
65 [2012] EWCA Civ 525. Noted by A Morris/K Oliphant, England and Wales, in: K Oliphant/ 
BC Steininger (eds), ETL 2012 (2013) 163, no 60. 
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In Haxton v Philips Electronics UK Ltd the claimant’s husband had died as a 
result of mesothelioma caused by the defendant’s negligence and so she had 
pursued a claim for loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act (FAA) 
1976.66 However, the claimant was herself then diagnosed with mesothelioma as 
a result of having washed her husband’s clothing. She settled her claim under 
the FAA 1976 for £ 200,000 less than she otherwise would have done based on 
her reduced life expectancy. She then pursued her own personal injury action 
against the defendant in negligence which included a claim for the £ 200,000 
diminution in value of her FAA claim. She argued that but for the defendant’s 
negligence, her life would not have been cut short and the assessment of her 
dependency claim would have been greater. The Court of Appeal found in her 
favour. Allowing the appeal would not interfere with the operation of the FAA 
scheme and there was nothing to suggest that Parliament intended to deny a 
claimant the right of recovery in such a situation. It was possible at law to re-
cover losses for a period when a claimant was no longer living and so she could 
recover losses for a period when she would not in fact have been dependent, 
especially as she had actually suffered the loss when she was alive. In addition, 
the loss was not too remote as it was reasonably foreseeable that a curtailment 
of life might lead to a diminution in the value of the claim even if it had involved 
a different tortfeasor.  
In Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG, the claimant’s husband was a British na-
tional serving with the British armed forces in Germany.67 He was fatally injured 
in a road traffic accident caused by a German national insured by a German in-
surance company. The claimant had been living with her husband in Germany 
at the time of the accident but had since returned to England and had two chil-
dren with a new partner. Neither jurisdiction nor liability were in issue but the 
applicable law governing the quantification of damages was tried as a prelimi-
nary issue. It was common ground that the claimant could bring a claim directly 
against the German insurer of the negligent driver in the English and Welsh 
courts. The parties agreed that German law governed the determination of li-
ability but disagreed as to which law applied in relation to the quantification of 
damages. The claimant argued that the Fatal Accidents Act (FAA) 1976 applied 
as this would result in more generous compensation than German law allowed 
in two respects. First, the FAA expressly excludes consideration of remarriage or 
the prospect of remarriage in assessing damages whereas German law may take 
account of any right to maintenance as a result of marriage or the birth of a 
 
_____ 
66 [2014] EWCA Civ 4. Noted by A Burin (2014) 77 Modern Law Review (MLR) 983. 
67 [2014] UKSC 22. Noted by HM Jack (2014) 164 (7615) NLJ 9. 
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child. Second, the FAA provides for a bereavement award for solatium whereas 
German law requires proof of psychological disturbance beyond normal griev-
ing and comparable to physical injury. The Supreme Court held that the claim-
ant’s damages should be assessed in accordance with the law of England and 
Wales but excluding the FAA. The relevant fatality arose prior to Rome II 
Regulation EC 864/2007 and so the claim was governed by the Private Interna-
tional Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. This provides that issues of 
substance will usually be determined in accordance with the place of injury 
whilst issues of procedure are to be determined in accordance with the law of 
the forum. The Supreme Court found that the FAA does not lay down general 
rules of English law but only rules applicable to actions under the Act itself. 
The action here arose under German law and so damages could not be as-
sessed with reference to the FAA. Instead, damages should be assessed in ac-
cordance with the normal common law so that the claimant should be put in 
the position she would have been in had her husband not been fatally injured. 
This meant that credit must be given for maintenance received from her current 
partner. 
 
 
C. Literature 
 
1. Mark Davies, The Law of Professional Immunities (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2014) 
 
The declared aim of this interesting and imaginatively conceived book is to ana-
lyse and critically review approaches to professional immunities, consider their 
purported rationales, and address more broadly the interaction of immunities 
with wider issues of professional negligence and regulation. The ‘immunities’ 
considered are construed rather broadly to encompass various forms of protec-
tive stance taken by the law towards professional persons (including the denial 
of a duty of care on grounds of ‘policy’). The author also takes a broad and 
flexible approach to what constitutes a ‘profession’ for these purposes, and ad-
dresses each of the following in turn: judges and other participants in court and 
dispute resolution processes (including advocates and expert witnesses), aca-
demics, medical practitioners, the police, the military and other uniformed ser-
vices, local government professionals (including those in the child welfare and 
educational fields), professional advisors (including accountants and solici-
tors), journalists and MPs. A theme running through the analysis is that the 
number of professional immunities has been dwindling in recent years, and 
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their scope diminishing, though some immunities apparently remain deeply 
entrenched. There is thus a lack of consistency in the law’s treatment of these 
issues, which leads the author to propose – at least for now – a negative answer 
to the question he asks in his concluding chapter: is there a ‘law of professional 
immunities’? Notwithstanding this downbeat finale, the book constitutes a sub-
stantial addition to the existing literature on professional liability and can cer-
tainly be recommended. 
 
 
2. Paula Giliker, The Europeanisation of English Tort Law 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014) Hart Studies in Private Law68 
 
In this thoughtful and perceptive volume, Giliker provides an excellent ac-
count of the (limited) influence to date of EU law and European human rights 
law on the English law of tort, and charts a way forward for English lawyers 
towards what she considers would be a more rewarding engagement with 
European sources. She rightly points out that many English lawyers have been 
resistant to European influence, seeing it as an attack on the integrity and co-
herence of the common law. This has created an environment in which ‘alien’ 
concepts introduced into English law from Europe have either been strictly 
delimited so as to keep them separate and distinct from ordinary tort law (as 
has occurred with claims for violating Convention rights under the Human 
Rights Act 1998) or absorbed into its fabric by analysing them in terms of es-
tablished English law categories (eg EU principles of Member State liability 
have been categorised within the tort of breach of statutory duty, while claims 
for violation of the right to privacy have been brought under the umbrella of 
breach of confidence). Giliker urges her compatriots to be more open to Euro-
pean influences, which she convincingly portrays as providing the impetus for 
improvements in the quality of English tort law (see also Oliphant (2009) 62 
Current Legal Problems 440, 469 ff). The book is highly recommended, not just 
for those English lawyers who are the objects of Giliker’s entreaties, but also for 
anyone interested in the reception of European legal principles within national 
legal systems. 
 
 
 
_____ 
68 Reviewed by M Groppo (2014) 25 King’s Law Journal 476. 
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3. Sir Peter North, Occupiers’ Liability (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2nd edn 2014) 
 
This is the second edition of a book whose first edition was published in 1971. In 
the long gap between editions, the law has moved on significantly, not least 
because of the legislative recognition of a duty of care to trespassers in the Oc-
cupiers’ Liability Act 1984. Naturally, the new Act is subjected to detailed analy-
sis in the new edition. The book’s coverage has also been extended to include 
the Defective Premises Act 1972, which deals not only with the liability of land-
lords out of possession for dangers on the premises (replacing provisions of the 
Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957) but also with the liability of builders, while pro-
viding for the duty of care owed in respect of any work on or in relation to prem-
ises not to be abated by the subsequent disposal of the premises by the person 
owing the duty. The book provides a short introductory account of the back-
ground to the various statutes before addressing the key concepts of ‘occupier’, 
‘visitor’ and ‘premises’. It then looks in more detail at the scope and content of 
the occupier’s statutory duty of care, contrasts the ‘occupancy’ and ‘activity’ 
duties owed by the occupier, examines the extent of liability under the Occupi-
ers’ Liability Acts for different types of harm, and considers the various defences 
available. The book provides concise and authoritative answers to numerous 
questions that have arisen or are likely to arise in practice and is, all in all, an 
extremely useful resource.  
 
 
4. John Oberdiek (ed), Philosophical Foundations of the Law 
of Torts (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014) 
 
This volume was explicitly conceived as the successor to the collection entitled 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law’ published by OUP under the editorship 
of David Owen in 1995. In his insightful and informative introduction, Oberdiek 
traces the historical lineage back to the pioneering work done on tort’s philoso-
phical foundations by Fletcher, Coleman, Weinrib and Honoré, whose mantle 
has been taken up by the more established scholars represented in this volume 
(such as Keating, Perry, and Goldberg and Zipursky) and passed on to a younger 
generation amongst whom the editor counts himself. Highlights amongst the 19 
original contributions include Goldberg and Zipursky’s refinement of their well-
known ‘civil recourse’ theory, Cane on ‘Tort Law and Public Functions’, Simons 
on the relationship between consent, assumption of risk and victim negligence, 
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Sebok on normative theories of punitive damages and Gardner on the place of 
distributive justice within the law of tort, an institution of corrective justice. No 
doubt others would pick out other contributions as particular favourites: the 
overall level of quality is exceedingly high. The book as a whole offers an excel-
lent indication of the state of tort law theory in 2015 and stands as a worthy suc-
cessor to Owen’s edited collection of 1995. 
 
 
5. Ben Pontin, Nuisance Law and Environmental Protection:  
A Study of Nuisance Injunctions in Practice (Lawtext 
Publishing, Witney 2014)69 
 
This is one of two books published in 2014 to address the previously neglected 
question of ‘what happens next’ after a nuisance injunction has been awarded. 
Like Rosenthal (see no 37 below), Pontin selects a number of nuisance decisions 
as case studies in which he investigates the consequences of the award. He 
chooses four well-known cases, each concerning serious pollution from fast-
developing industry, one of which (Attorney-General v Birmingham Corporation) 
is also in Rosenthal’s selection, thus providing a useful opportunity to compare 
the rival approaches and conclusions. Pontin’s research is based mainly on 
published books and public records, and he is much more interested in the per-
sonalities involved in his chosen cases – especially the claimants, whom he por-
trays in heroic light as proto-environmentalists (see especially p 59). Like 
Rosenthal, he gives little credence to the conjecture that awarding an injunction 
might cause the closure of the polluting enterprise, but he sets greater store on 
the alternative hypothesis that the injunction might induce investment in 
cleaner technology and so result in significant pollution-reduction (about which 
Rosenthal is somewhat sceptical, having regard to the limits of what was possi-
ble and reasonably affordable at the time). Conversely, Pontin is extremely du-
bious of the scope for ‘Coasian’ agreements whereby the defendant subject to 
the injunction effectively buys the claimant’s permission to continue the pollut-
ing activity. He pleads his case well, and his illuminating and learned study is 
certainly to be recommended, both in its own right and as a complement to 
Rosenthal’s alternative account. 
 
 
_____ 
69 Reviewed by M Lee (2014) 77 MLR 669 and M Wilde (2015) 36 Journal of Legal History 122. 
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6. James Price QC/Felicity McMahon (eds), Blackstone’s Guide 
to The Defamation Act 2013 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2013) 
 
The Defamation Act 201370 codified aspects of the law of libel and slander in 
England and Wales at the same time as introducing substantive reforms with 
the expressed aim of ensuring better protection of freedom of expression 
while maintaining an appropriate balance with the protection of reputation. 
This very useful volume describes the background to the Act (including the 
Ministry of Justice’s consultation and the Act’s passage through Parliament) 
and then provides detailed analysis of its provisions, drawing upon the Par-
liamentary debates to illuminate key concepts. The book provides an ideal 
starting point if one wants to understand the new requirement of ‘serious 
harm’, the new statutory defences of truth, honest opinion or matter of pub-
lic interest, the new protections given to the operators of websites and the 
publishers of peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals, the 
new ‘single publication rule’, or the other changes effected by the Act. 
Though aimed primarily at legal practitioners, the guide will also be of con-
siderable use to academics and students with interests in the law of libel and 
slander. 
 
 
7. Leslie Rosenthal, The River Pollution Dilemma in Victorian 
England: Nuisance Law versus Economic Efficiency (Ashgate 
Publishing, Farnham 2014) Modern Economic and Social 
History 
 
Rosenthal provides an engrossing and insightful account of the resolution of 
legal disputes caused by ‘the river pollution dilemma’ in Victorian England. 
The dilemma in question arose because the sanitation systems devised to en-
sure the health of rapidly growing urban populations unavoidably led to the 
discharge of large amounts of sewage effluent in nearby rivers and thus inter-
fered with the property rights of riparian landowners. In ten detailed case stud-
ies, he shows how the landowners affected were able to get injunctions in the 
 
_____ 
70 Noted by Oliphant/Morris (fn 57) 183, no 1 ff. 
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law of nuisance. But, for the author, that is only the starting point for inquiry, 
as his interest is not so much in court judgments or substantive legal rules but 
in the question ‘what happened next?’ He therefore explores the historical re-
cord to see how, if at all, the injunctions were enforced in practice, what fur-
ther dealings there were between the parties, and what further involvement by 
the court, and what was ultimately the impact on the defendants’ activities 
and water quality in rivers. A key and original insight is that courts often is-
sued contingent injunctions which would only be triggered if, for example, the 
defendant failed to take appropriate steps to prevent or reduce the pollution. 
The judge thus assumed a post-trial supervisory or managerial role so as to 
promote the satisfactory resolution of the dispute. Of further note is that this 
was achieved in all ten of the chosen cases without seriously compromising the 
sewerage systems involved. The author’s findings are based on meticulous re-
search encompassing (inter alia) court records, town council minutes, local 
newspapers and family archives, and are informed by theoretical insights de-
rived from the economic analysis of law. All in all, it counts as a major addition 
to the literature. 
 
 
8. New Editions of Established Texts 
 
Textbooks: P Giliker, Tort (5th edn 2014); K Horsey/E Rackley, Tort Law (3rd edn 
2013); WE Peel/J Goudkamp, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (19th edn 2014) 
 
Practitioners’ Reference: MA Jones (general ed), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (21st 
edn 2014) 
 
Text and Materials: M Lunney/K Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (5th 
edn 2013); J Steele, Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn 2014) 
 
Comparative Tort Law: C van Dam, European Tort Law (2nd edn 2013) 
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